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ABSTRACT
In response to the 2010 U.S. National Space Policy’s call to “rapidly detect, warn, characterize, and attribute
natural and man-made disturbances to space systems” the Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures (SCAF) Workshop
has been pressing the community to improve skills in anomaly attribution. Five years of presentations, case
studies, and insights have identified a clear requirement to create a spacecraft anomaly reporting standard. This
new standard is motivated by the fact that previous anomaly investigations suffer from lack of diagnostics on
spacecraft, limited benefit for operators to determine root cause, uncertainties in vulnerability models, and
complicated space environment phenomena. As a result, it is important for this process to be both effective and
efficient or else it will not be embraced. The Universal Satellite Anomalies Analysis Advisor, USA3 is a
proposed starting point for this solution: must assign anomaly/failure root cause to the (1) lowest possible
hardware level associated with a (2) specific causative trigger by (3) tracking symptoms in time (both in relative
and absolute terms). The ability to discern the cause of a space system failure will become more important as
more new space users operate new satellite systems, the orbital debris hazard continues to grow, and space
system performance becomes more ubiquitous to everyday life on Earth. This paper provides a starting point
that through interagency and cross-community review and refinement may evolve into an anomaly attribution
framework standard.
BACKGROUND
Spacecraft anomaly attribution (i.e., determination of
root cause) is critical for a variety of reasons. The
ability to determine the root cause of a satellite anomaly
provides the means to (1) validate space environmental
models; (2) give feedback to design and parts selection;
(3) support vulnerability and failure model
enhancements; (4) provide input for insurance
processing; and (5) contribute insights into geo-political
discussions about disruption of satellite operations.
At a higher level, we are striving to improve anomaly
attribution because the U.S. National Space Policy
2010, Presidential Directive-4, calls for us to do so:
“Improve, develop, and demonstrate, in cooperation
with relevant departments and agencies and
commercial and foreign entities, the ability to rapidly
detect, warn, characterize, and attribute natural and
man-made disturbances to space systems of US
interest.”
As the space environment becomes more globalized and
populated with first-time users, anomalies will likely
continue to occur even as reliability of legacy space
systems improve.
The determination of root cause for satellite anomalies
(i.e., anomaly attribution) is complicated by (1) the
dynamic space environment; (2) the lack of onboard
diagnostics to aid in anomaly investigations; (3) the
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lack of motivation of space programs to determine root
cause and share failures with others; (4) lack of
spacecraft (system, subsystem, and component) design
information; (5) inconsistency between the design and
the final state a satellite was launched; (6) the
complexity and variability of failure modes such as
impacts, charging, contamination, etc.; (7) the fact that
failures often are the result of more than one trigger;
and (8) lack of common terminology and a standard
anomaly attribution process.1-7
The net result of these investigations is that a new
process for the investigation and documentation related
to satellite anomaly attribution root cause is needed to
enable the sharing of anomaly data community-wide to
improve space operations assurance for all space
systems. This new approach primarily focuses on
solving the last of the eight issues outlined above
understanding the importance of the context that the
first seven issues provide.
UNIVERSAL
SATELLITE
ANALYSIS ADVISOR (USA3)

ANOMALIES

The original direction of the anomaly attribution
process was to look back at previous anomalies and
start to implement a new way of examining previous
anomalies across a variety of sources to weave together
a unified database of anomalies. To execute this
approach, anomalies from the following sources were
examined (1) Satellite News Digest: open source web
site at https://www.sat-nd.com/; (2) LEO debris events
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compiled by D. McKnight (included in Appendix A);
(3) NASA Goddard Space Flight Center database5; (4)
NASA Spacecraft Anomalies Report6; (5) NASA
SOARS/META database (only available through
NASA); and (6) XL Catlin insurance anomalies.

Clear Objectives
There are two objectives of the proposed anomaly
attribution process: (1) provide guidelines to
standardize the way spacecraft anomalies are described,
recorded, and shared to enable future anomaly reports
to be easily combined to provide insights to enhance
space operations assurance for the entire community;
and (2) assemble lessons learned and insights about
spacecraft anomaly attribution that can help spacecraft
operators better determine the root cause.

The major components of the USA3 format are: (1)
name of anomaly; (2) Dates – event, documentation,
and resolution; (3) Spacecraft Specifics – orbit, object
characteristics, and state before/after event; (4)
Symptoms 1, 2, and 3 (as appropriate); and (5)
Attribution (i.e., root cause). This process has two
major design objectives:

Objective 1 is largely satisfied by the following
“Standard Terminology” section. The basis of applying
best practices and disciplined anomaly investigation
methods can only succeed if everyone is first using the
same terms. This list of terms is an essential aspect of
the development of this overall anomaly attribution
guideline partially because it is so important and
partially because it is a tedious task.

- Trace the event to the lowest possible component
of the spacecraft (i.e., mission effect to system to
subsystem to component) and;
- Recreate an accurate timeline of measurable and
inferred events to insure that cause and effect
hypotheses are tested sufficiently.

Objective 2 is largely satisfied by the remainder of the
guidelines. It is important to note that this document is
striving to provide a “lean” process. That is to say, it is
comprehensive in topics but not overly prescriptive in
how to satisfy the. There is an emphasis on suggesting
to only do work that efficiently contributes to a solid
root cause determination for an anomaly.

The lessons learned from this investigation resulted in
the conclusion that past anomalies databases are not of
sufficient common terminology and process to be
leveraged by the USA3 approach. Instead, a new
guideline needs to be created that will enable future
anomalies to be combined and global observations and
insights made to assist all space users to minimize
future failures.

Standard Terminology
The framework of what terminology needs to be agreed
upon begins with the definition of an anomaly: A
spacecraft anomaly is defined as a functional
perturbation to a satellite component, subsystem, or
system that can be traced to a manmade or natural
trigger. Even if the “anomaly” was expected, it is still
an anomaly to the operations of that part of the satellite.

ANOMALY ATTRIBUTION PROCESS
As a result, a new anomaly attribution process is
proposed. There are many very robust and complete
anomaly attribution processes already established.8-10
These types of resources may well be referenced and
used often during the execution of the framework
described in this paper.

However, from the Orion programs11 a different
definition for anomaly and failure are proposed: An
anomaly is defined as any deviation of system,
subsystem, and/or hardware performance beyond
previously established limits. A failure is defined as the
inability of a system, subsystem, software/firmware,
and/or hardware to perform its required function.

However, the goal of this process is to create a
guideline that is concise, readable, and compelling. In
order for this to be the case, it cannot be complete, like
many of these other solutions. In addition, it must be
community-agnostic (i.e., can be used equally well for
large military spacecraft and small commercial
platforms).

Part of the purpose of this paper is to motivate
feedback; so, which definition of anomaly and failure
do you prefer? Some early reviewers have suggested
that only major permanent anomalies or failures will
ever really be assessed using a comprehensive anomaly
attribution process.

With that spirit in mind, there are a few key aspects that
must exist within this “guideline” or “framework.”
These are (1) clear objective(s), (2) standard
terminology, (3) overarching principles, and (4)
standard process. These four components will now be
presented in that order.
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The “devil is in the details” no matter which anomaly
definition is used. The listing below provides an initial
framework for the terms that need to be considered to
be included in this terminology section.
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Spacecraft Mission - the ultimate purpose of the
satellite:

- Thermal control system has possible subsystems of
louvers, MLI, heat sink, electric heater, etc.

- Remote sensing (or Earth observation)

Component - key subset of a subsystem that nominally
serves a clear traceable purpose to a subsystem. Typical
components of several subsystems are detailed below:

- Meteorology
- Position, navigation, & timing (PNT)

- Battery has components of casing, electrolyte, anode,
and cathode.

- Communications (voice, video, and data)

- Star tracker has sensor, memory, processor (i.e.,
CPU), and power conditioning.

- Science and astronomy
- Manned spaceflight

- Signal processing has pre-amplifier, timing/control
(clock), power conditioning, and analog-to-digital
converter.

System - primary supporting function of space
platform:

Overarching Principles

- Payload
- Communications
control)

(i.e.,

telemetry,

tracking,

Four key principles are proposed for development of an
anomaly attribution procedure:

and

RESOLUTION: Assign the anomaly to the lowest
hardware level possible. For example, component
failure is more useful than system or subsystem
degradation since there are so many possible
components within a subsystem or system.

- Data Handling
- Power
- Propulsion

CAUSALITY: Identify the causative phenomena (i.e.,
trigger) uniquely. For example, rather than stating
“space weather,” determine between electron or proton
flux or charged particles.

- Attitude Determination & Control
- Thermal Control
- Structure

TIMELINE: Time sequencing is very important; build a
timeline of when symptoms occurred. Note that this
may not be when they were first detected or observed.

Subsystem - key segments of a system:
- Communications system has subsystems of antenna,
transmitter, receiver, transponder (i.e., transmitter and
receiver together), diplexer & switches, and signal
processing.

OPTIONS: Have you proposed three alternatives to the
potential root cause before deciding on one to insure
that you are not just trying to find data to support your
first hypothesis (i.e., avoid confirmation bias).

- Data handling system has subsystems of command
unit, clock, telemetry, recorder, memory, pulse
modulation encoder, and fault protection.

These four principles are not created equal. The first
three are engineering directives that drive information
gathering in three different dimensions: (1) Resolution
relates to hardware (i.e., what failed); (2) Causality
focuses on a trigger (i.e., what caused failure); and (3)
Timeline empowers cause and effect (i.e., order of
events).

- Power system has subsystems of batteries, fuel cells,
power control unit, regulators/converters, wiring, and
solar arrays.
- Propulsion has possible subsystems of thrusters,
propellant, tank, fuel lines, pump, nozzle, etc.

The last principle (i.e., develop three options before
deciding on root cause) provides a guard against
fixating on a root cause too soon (i.e., without
considering dissenting options to the first viable
option).

- Attitude Determination & Control system has
subsystems of control computer, reaction wheels,
control moment gyros, magnetometer, Earth sensor,
star sensor/tracker, sun sensor, horizon sensor,
actuator/thruster, etc.

McKnight
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Standard Process
As the investigation progresses, some of the anomaly
attribution team representatives (e.g., thermal
management, etc.) may be dropped off of the team and
others could be added.

The process by which these principles can be applied to
investigate an anomaly will occur after three planning
steps detailed below:
Establish an Anomaly Attribution Team:

Retrieve System Documentation:

The makeup of the anomaly attribution team is critical
to determining a root cause. The makeup and execution
of this team should be planned for well before any
event. This team should reflect a diversity of insights
from across your organization and could initially
include12:

The likely first step of an Anomaly Attribution Team is
to retrieve space system documentation. Information
about the space system that has suffered an anomaly
may actually be very difficult to access.

- Program Manager (PM) for space platform that was
affected: responsible for the space system’s
performance.

Just because you are operating a satellite does not mean
that you actually know what the thickness of propellant
tanks are or the number of layers of MLI or spacing
between the MLI layers of them around a battery
casing.

- Boss of PM for space platform that failed: show
management commitment to importance of anomaly
attribution process.
- Primary space system operator for platform affected:
knowledgeable of operational performance but not an
engineer with knowledge of design; knows “function
over form.”

While it may never be needed, it is prudent to start an
operational space program with a complete set of
documentation for the satellite you are operating. A
good test of completeness of the documentation is
whether it is sufficient to allow you to build a new one
from the specifications.
This baselining of system documentation is essential
since once an anomaly occurs and you are trying to
recreate a failure or test phenomenological issues,
differences in what has been deployed to space cannot
differ from your modeled understanding of it if you
hope to determine root cause.

- Payload system lead for space platform affected:
payload is reason for all of the other systems so
he/she represents platform “customer.”
- Power system lead for space platform affected: power
system is integral to any anomaly so all other systems
are sensitive to its performance.

Assemble Anomaly Information:
The source and types of data needed depend
significantly on the characteristics of the satellite and its
operations. Knowing where you might find useful
anomaly information is critical. It may come from onboard diagnostics (e.g., telemetry from temperature
sensors), mission performance (e.g., data being
transmitted by system only at half of normal data rate),
third-party observers (e.g., astronomical observers
sensing a tumble of your, previously 3-axis stabilized,
satellite), etc.

- Attitude and control system (ACS) lead for space
platform affected: ACS is integral to any anomaly
especially when one of the symptoms is an
orientation perturbation.
- Communication system lead for space platform
affected: communication system is integral to any
anomaly as cessation of communications may be the
first indicator of some anomalies.
- Thermal management system lead for space platform
affected: thermal management system may be
integral to some anomalies as temperature variations
from normal may be both an intermediate indicator of
an anomaly or the primary mission effect.

It is critical that data not be filtered too soon as to what
is relevant and what is not. Oftentimes, the leading
candidate for the root cause might skew the
investigation by causing the investigators to
preferentially pay attention to data that confirms the
first likely root cause candidate. Guard against this
tendency to limit data assemblage too soon and based
upon being “irrelevant” to initial theories for the
anomaly root cause.

- System engineer from a different space platform than
affected: objective, but qualified, technical bystander.
- Manager from a different space platform than
affected: objective but qualified management
bystander to lead the investigation.
McKnight
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The actual execution of the four principles is largely
done in support of the analysis. The needed activities
are largely captured by model runs, simulations, and
testing.

a loss of redundancy to create an anomaly, the trigger
for the second event (e.g., loss of redundancy) may be
judged (erroneously) as the sole contributor to the
reported anomaly (i.e., mission effect).

Model Runs, Simulations, and Testing:

Figure 1 displays the total anomaly attribution process:

The process by which a root cause is determined is
highly iterative and includes information gathering,
reporting, model runs, simulations, and testing in order
to adjudicate hypotheses; in essence, determine the one
best hypothesis. However, explaining alternative
hypotheses that have eventually been ruled out provides
reviewers both results and the logic to derive these
results.
It is also important to remember that oftentimes an
anomaly is the result of more than one trigger acting
over a period of time. When a minor failure (that
produces no immediate mission effect) is coupled with

-

Planning steps are critical to the overall
sequence and eventual anomaly resolution;

-

Execution applies engineering and cognitive
principles to efficiently investigate an
anomaly; and

-

Model runs, simulations, and testing provide
the concrete attribution information. Appendix
C contains a comprehensive list of root cause
attribution techniques taken from Reference
10.

Figure 1. Anomaly attribution process includes both planning before an event and execution of key
principles afterwards.
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anomaly as a debris are summarized in Figure 2.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As this process is in its infancy, the hoped-for status
over the next year is to present this proposed process to
as many people as possible with a focus on people with
operational space experience.

A test that has become more suggestive of a debris
impact is summarized in the table of impact indicators
provided in Appendix B. However, it is a
straightforward requirement (though problematic in
reality) that a debris impact can really only be verified
by visual inspection or by having two independent,
related observables occur simultaneously. For example,
if the solar array power output drops by 20% instantly
while an angular perturbation is detected for the entire
spacecraft then particulate impact is likely to be the root
cause.

The goal is to be useful but not onerous so that
everyone will be willing and excited about reading the
guideline and can then incorporate relevant aspects of
the process into their existing operational procedures.
It should be noted that no matter how much we focus on
the engineering and technical aspects of the anomaly
attribution process, we cannot forget that the
administrative aspects of this sequence are just as
important; if overlooked, the entire process will fail.

Similar tables to the one included in Appendix B for
indicators of a debris impact but for other anomaly
triggers would provide a valuable resource for future
anomaly investigations. These would include
electrostatic charging, total radiation dose, displacement
damage, single event upset, contamination, and atomic
oxygen erosion, at a minimum.

A parting observation on the difficulty of this process
can be made when looking at how to discern if a
spacecraft has been struck by a piece of nontrackable
space debris. The ability to sense whether or not a
satellite was disrupted by an orbital debris impact is not
as easy as it might seem.
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Appendix A. LEO Potential Particulate Impact Events

Event

Object(s)

Size/Mass

Altitude (km)
Inclination

Cosmos
1934
struck by
debris

Russian P/L (18985) 1988023A

P/L: ~2-4m2
700-800kg?

debris #13475

Debris:~0.6kg

Cerise
boom
severed

French Recon Sat
(23606/1995-33B)

Anomaly Date & Time

Lat/Long

950 x 1010 i=83

12/23/91
@980km @14.3km/s

~50N/
Unknown

~0.49 m2 50kg

656 x 681 i=98.1

38.2S/59.7E

Debris fragment (18208)

~0.098 m2
~1-4.5kg?

653 x 685 i=98.5

07/24/1996 0948; On
ascending pass; impact
velocity of 14.8km/s
@685km

SUNSAT
(SO-35)

South African university
small sat

64kg; 45/45/60cm

400 x 838km;
i = 93°

01/19/2001

Unknown

JASON1

NASA/CNES
Oceanographic sat, 200155A; 26997

Bus 1m cube with
4m long solar arrays;
500kg

~1336km and 66°

03/2002

10.75S;
59.18E

Cosmos
539

Russian geodetic satellite
(6319) 1972-102A

6m2,600kg;2m cyl +
solar arrays

1340 x 1380km
i=74

04/21/2002

72S/36.75W

DMSP-5B
F5 R/B hit
by CZ-4
debris

Thor Burner 2A LV (07219)
/1974-15A

1m2
37.5-50kg

775 x 885 i=99.1

1/17/05 0214; impact
velocity of 5.7km/s

80.6S/53W

Chinese R/B frag (26207)

0.06m2 ~1-2kg

671 x 847 i=98.2

Nadezhda
2 R/B

R/B

Cyl; D=2.4m x L=6m

950x1015km; i=83

06/22/2005

Unknown

JASON1

NASA/CNES
Oceanographic sat, 200155A; 26997

Bus 1m cube with
4m long solar arrays;
500kg

~1336km and 66°

09/2005

52.36S;
100.4E

Cosmos
2251
/
Iridium 33
collision

Russian Comm. Sat. (22675)

~6m2 ; 900kg

778 x 803km; i=74

02/10/09 1656 @ 789km
@11.6km/s

72N/97E

Comm. Sat. (24946)

>2.6m2 560kg

785 x 794km
i =86.4

Iridium

SV29

>2.6m2 560kg

05/24/2009

???

EOS-Terra

A-Train satellite NASA

6.8m long, 3.5m
wide; 5,190kg

705km; i=98.2°

10/13/2009
1624GMT

???

Aura

NASA atmospheric science
satellite

1,765kg; 6.9mx2m
body plus 18m array

685 x685; i =98.2°

03/12/2010

Unknown

BLITS
altitude
drop

Laser ranging target (35871)

~0.023 m2 7.53 kg

832 x ~800; i=98.6

0800 on 01/22/2013

80.6S/53W
69.4N/38.9E

Pegaso

Ecuadorian cubesat (39151)

~0.075m2 1.2 kg

650 x 654; i=98.1

05/22/2013 0538

62.98S/

unresponsi
McKnight
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Comm sat

>2.6m2 560kg
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785 x 795km

06/07/2014

Unknown
checking

-

Event

Object(s)

Pegaso
unresponsive

Ecuadorian
(39151)

Iridium-47

Comm sat

cubesat

Size/Mass

Altitude (km)
Inclination

~0.075m2 1.2 kg

>2.6m2 560kg

1997-082C

&

Anomaly
Date
&
Time

Lat/Long

650 x 654; i=98.1

05/22/2013
0538

62.98S/ 90.48W

785 x 795km

06/07/2014

Unknown - checking

i = 86.4°

0330 UTC

785 x 795km

11/30/2014

i = 86.4°

1615UTC

770km

07/19/16
(5:09pm
EST)

SATNO 25106
Iridium-91

Comm sat

>2.6m2 560kg

#27372
WorldView2

Payload

4.3mx2.5m;
7.1m
solar arrays; 2800kg

#35946
Sentinel-1A

Payload

i= 98.54°
3.4m ×1.3 m
2,170kg

bus;

693km sun-synch;
i=98.18°

#39634

Delta R/B

Rocket Body

Unknown - checking

08/23/16
17:07:37U
TC

6m x 1.4m; 800kg

1,450km

1968-114B

McKnight
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Appendix B. Debris Impact Indicators

Physical Relevance

Exemptions

Examples
(See
Appendix A for list
of
MMOD
anomalies)

For micrometeoroids, they
have a tendency to vaporize
on impact, which does not
transfer
mechanical
momentum as well, however,
the ejecta is released in the
opposite direction to the
impact direction that may
produce
a
momentum
enhancement effect (due to
the rebounding ejecta from
the impacted surface).

GOES-13
(2013)
angular perturbation
was determined to
have been from a
micrometeoroid
strike
since
it
occurred during a
helion
micrometeoroid
event
and
examination of the
“rush hours” for
GOES-13 did not
hint at an orbital
debris impact.

It is difficult to tell the
difference
between
a
micrometeoroid or orbital
debris impact except that
micrometeoroid
impacts
often
create
electrical
anomalies (due to their very
high velocities) in addition to
the physical damage. An
impact-induced
electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
looks similar to electrostatic
discharge (ESD) except that
it might correlate with a peak
in a meteor shower and be
counter to normal ESD
triggers (i.e., decreasing
solar activity and coming out
of eclipse).

Olympus
(1993),
ADEOS-II (2003),
and ALOS (2011)

Abrupt loss of
power in tandem
with an angular
perturbation to a
satellite
is
indicative of a
particulate impact
of a solar array.
Sometimes
the
perturbation occurs
without a drop in
power in case it
strikes a joint or
edge of the solar
array.

Ghost “Power” Torque

The farther out the
impact occurs on the
array and the more
massive the impacting
object is, the greater the
angular perturbation will
be.
More massive
objects impart a smaller
percentage
of
their
original momentum to
the solar array than
smaller (marginally or
non-penetrating objects).

Short in exposed
cabling, degradation
of thermal control,
or start of a leak of
propulsion system
in tandem with an
angular
and/or
linear perturbation
to the spacecraft.

Hybrid Combination Failure

Name

Observable

These subsystems are
closer to the center of
mass of the satellite so
impacts on them are not
as likely to cause an
angular perturbation. A
linear
impulse
will
change the orbit rather
than the orientation of
the satellite.

McKnight
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Ghost Impulse

In LEO, if the event
occurs near the
object’s apex (i.e.,
near its highest
northerly or highest
southerly latitude)
it is likely an orbital
debris collision.

GOES-10
(2011),
derelict payload in
GEO graveyard, had
its
orbit
altered
abruptly
(dropped
20km) but no debris
liberated.
The
perturbation
was
much greater than
could have been
expected from an
ESD event or SRP.1

Impulse and Debris

If
two
LEO
cataloged objects
collide, the result is
usually at least the
perturbation of one
object
and
potentially
the
replacement of one
object with a debris
cloud.
If
both
objects are large
enough there will
be
two
debris
clouds.

Meteoroids are not massive
enough for this to typically
occur and a debris impact in
LEO is likely to create
debris but not so in GEO
where momentum might be
absorbed fully.

This is difficult to
differentiate from an
explosion
of
a
subsystem
for
an
operational spacecraft
(since there are sources
for energy liberation
such as battery casing
ruptures or propulsion
system malfunctions).

This is more likely to occur
in LEO with the greater
closing velocities for orbital
debris than in GEO.
However, micrometeoroid
impacts will be difficult to
differentiate from strikes
from nontrackable orbital
debris but also are less
likely to have sufficient
linear
momentum
transferred.

Cosmos 1934 (1991),
DMSP rocket body
(2005), and BLITS
(2013). The 1991
C1934 event was not
discovered
until
archives
were
searched after the
2005 DMSP rocket
body glancing blow
occurred.

Cataloged Collision

Abrupt change in
an object’s orbit
despite there being
no energy source
onboard to provide
such a perturbation
but
debris
is
liberated

A piece of nontrackable
debris that strikes an
object may only cause a
change in the orbit
without producing any
debris.

Hypervelocity impacts
cause the solid material
to behave as a liquid
creating many more
fragments and liberating
them in all directions
(relative to center of
mass of fragmented
object).

This is much more likely to
occur in LEO with the
greater closing velocities. At
GEO, two cataloged objects
colliding may not create as
much trackable debris since
it will be a much slower
impact velocity.

Cerise (1996) and
Iridium/Cosmos2251
(2009).
Cerise
continued to function,
though below normal
performance levels,
for years after the
encounter.

Apex Trend

Abrupt change in
an object’s orbit
despite there being
no energy source
onboard to provide
such a perturbation
and
no
debris
liberated. This is
more likely in GEO
because of the
lower
impact
velocities.

Collision hazard for a
typical
(i.e.,
high
inclination object, i >
50°) LEO satellite is
lower near equator and
higher near apex.

This holds only for LEO
high inclination (i > 50°)
objects.

Of the five known
encounters between
trackable debris, four
have occurred above
70° N or S; Cosmos
539, Cosmos 1934,
Iridium-33,
and
DMSP R/B. Cerise
occurred at 38°S.
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Rush Hour Trend

Multiple
systems
fail simultaneously
while power is still
intact yet no debris
is produced.

Not all debris syncs up with
the “conga line” motion: 6-8
tracked objects (out of
nearly 800) at any time have
been seen to move counter
to this motion. High area-tomass objects may be
perturbed by SRP and,
therefore, present a collision
hazard out of the “rush
hours.”
These
objects
would, however, likely
spend very little time in the
vicinity of GSO assets so the
collision probability is very
low.

No examples

Multiple (Separate), Temporary

An anomaly that is
temporary and/or is
repeated
is
not
likely to be debrisinduced.

The timing of debris
impacts on a stationkept GEO satellite from
derelict objects or debris
will occur in regular
intervals called “rush
hours.”

Impacts are rare events
so it is exceedingly
unlikely
to
have
multiple
on
same
satellite…

…unless it is close to a
recently produced cloud
(e.g., below a sloughing
object or conjuncting a
debris cloud from a recent
breakup). If a particle
impacts
a
non-critical
surface, there may be a
temporary pointing anomaly
that may be correctable (i.e.,
temporary).

No examples

Multiple Simultaneous

In GEO, if the
anomaly occurred
during
a
“rush
hour,” then it is
indicative
of
a
debris impact.

Assumed the only way
for this to happen is for
a fragment to knock out
several systems at once.
It would seem that
debris would likely be
produced from such an
event.

If all systems are controlled
by the same satellite central
processor, failure of this
component due to deep
internal
charging
or
disruption by a high energy
particle could spoof this
failure mode.

SUNSAT-35 (2001)
claimed this failure
mode, but no debris
was observed.
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Appendix C. Root cause attribution (RCA) techniques pros and cons. 10
RCA Method

Pros

Cons

Brainstorming

Good technique for identifying
potential causes and contributing
factors.

Is a data gathering technique, not a
classification and prioritization
process.

Cause and Effect Diagram
(Fishbone)

Permits consideration of many
different items.

Inability to easily identify and
communicate
potential
interrelationship between multiple items.

Enables planning, executing, and
recording results for multiple
investigative paths in parallel.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)

Help to understand logic leading to
event.
Many software tools are available.

Best suited for simple problems with
independent causes.
Requires knowledge of the process.
FTA typically used as trial and error
method in conjunction with a parts
list.

Advanced Cause and Effect
(ACEA)

Good tool for complex problems
with dependent causes.

Requires thorough understanding of
cause and effect relationships and
their interactions.

Cause Mapping

Can be large or small depending on
complexity of scenario.

Difficult to learn and use.

Allows for clear association
between causes and corrective
actions, with a higher likelihood of
implementation.
Why-Why Charts

A good tool for simple problems
with dependent causes.

Typically, based on attribute-based
thinking rather than a process
perspective.

Process
Classification
Cause and Effect (CE)
Diagram

Easy to construct and allow the
team to remain engaged in the
brainstorming activity as the focus
moves from one process to the
next.

Similar potential causes may
repeatedly appear at the different
process steps.

Invite team to consider conditions
and events between the process
steps that could potentially be a
primary cause of the problem.

McKnight
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